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Pro-poor benefit distribution in REDD+
Ensuring that the poor or the most vulnerable sections of society benefit from REDD+ projects is 
crucial to building both national and international legitimacy and to fostering successful delivery 
of conservation and social objectives. In both academic and non-academic literature, issues of 
the equity of benefit-sharing at a community or household level are overlooked compared with 
distributional issues at the national and international level. Therefore, this paper aims to look 
at some of the issues related to benefit distribution at village and household level. Two very 
important factors that are likely to affect benefit distribution from REDD+ at a village level are 
whether payments are made directly to households or to communities as a whole; and whether 
payments are made in cash or in kind. In addition, the paper looks at the following design 
questions, which are closely related to these above factors:
1. What should the provision of benefits be based on – landholding size, actual emission reductions 
or the demography of the community – to ensure that equitable design criteria are met? 
2. How can it be ensured that more vulnerable groups such as ethnic minorities, the small-
landholders and landless poor, women and children do not lose out?
3. What impact would the type of benefit transferred have on the well-being of the communities 
and the local economy?
To this end, experiences are reviewed from payments for ecosystem services, integrated 
conservation and development projects, community-based natural resource management and 
food or cash transfer programmes across the global south. In addition, benefit distribution 
systems that would enable the REDD+ pilot projects in general are suggested, and the REDD pilot 
project in Cat Tien National Park in particular, to be more pro-poor. Evidence is examined on how 
well schemes meet external criteria of equitable benefit distribution as well as assessing the 
perceptions of those involved. Conclusions drawn include:
l Whether benefits are provided to a community as a whole or to individual households, and 
what benefits to transfer, are decisions that should be made on the basis of community 
consultation and careful assessment of their preferences.
l Even though determining payment types and levels is best tailored through consultations with 
local people to best match community aspirations and those in need, economic feasibility, local 
institutional capacity and governance structures, and the effects on the local economy and on 
the livelihoods of the poor households should be carefully weighed and assessed.
l Assessment of the preference for payment type should not be a one-off activity. Because 
participant communities are unlikely to have experience in receiving rewards in exchange for 
ecosystem service provision, their stated preferences may not be accurate in the early stages 
of the scheme. Once the scheme is implemented and communities start receiving payment, 
their preferences should be periodically assessed and changes in payment type should be 
made accordingly. This will increase the implementation and transaction costs of REDD+. Project 
developers and designers should budget for the cost of participation at the project design phase.
l To promote pro-poor benefit distribution from REDD+ interventions, benefit distribution based 
on proportionality and the equality of opportunities to participate would be more relevant in 
areas where the participants are characterized by less inequality. In an unequal society (for 
example characterized by land disparity), on the other hand, benefit distribution based on need 
that positively discriminates in favour of the poor would be more desirable so that poor or weak 
claimants do not receive disproportionately lower benefits than the relatively well-off.
Abstract
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Emissions from deforestation are estimated to contribute up to 17 per cent of global greenhouse 
gas emissions (IPCC, 2007) – the third-largest source of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions 
after energy supply and industrial activity (Karousakis, 2009). It was only at the 11th Conference 
of the Parties (COP11) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 
Montreal in 2005 that integrating the reduction of emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation (REDD) in developing countries into the post-Kyoto climate change regime was 
proposed by the government of Papua New Guinea on behalf of the Coalition for Rainforest 
Nations. REDD was recognized and later incorporated into the Bali Action Roadmap (Carpenter, 
2008), which further included the role of conservation, sustainable forest management and the 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks, which is commonly known as REDD+. Few issues have 
dominated the recent environmental debate as much as the proposal of including REDD in a 
post-2012 international climate policy agreement (Börner et al., 2010). The basic idea behind 
REDD is simple: countries that are willing and able to reduce emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation should be compensated for doing so (Scholz and Schmidt, 2008). It is 
predicted that financial flows for greenhouse gas emission reductions from REDD+ could reach 
up to US$30 billion a year (UN-REDD, n.d.).
The issue of distribution remains key to ensuring that the poor or the most vulnerable 
sections of society benefit from REDD+. According to Peskett et al. (2008), one of the main 
reasons equitable or fairer benefit-sharing is important is in order to build wider national (and 
international) legitimacy and support behind the REDD+ mechanism. If a REDD+ intervention is 
perceived as illegitimate, this may lead to conflict and jeopardize environmental conservation 
efforts as well as the effectiveness of the scheme. Lindhjem et al. (2009) state that careful 
balancing between effective incentives and legitimacy is needed. Gaining the support of local, 
resource-dependent people through improvements to their livelihoods and poverty alleviation 
may in turn assist in the achievement of conservation objectives (Groom and Palmer, 2008). 
Lindhjem et al. (2009) argue that, to foster legitimacy for REDD+, enough people must benefit 
but, if too many people benefit from something they did not contribute to, this will dilute 
incentives, which may result in lower emission reductions and in lower overall benefits to share. 
On the other hand, if rewards are given only to certain groups, actions or geographical areas, 
people may feel unfairly treated and turn against the whole mechanism as illegitimate. Thus, a 
clearer understanding of distributional issues is becoming increasingly important for the design 
of REDD+ (Porras, 2010).
Benefits distribution issues are important at the international level – where financial rewards are 
transferred to recipient countries – and at national and sub-national levels – where benefits from 
REDD+ are disbursed from national governments to local governments and other entities such as 
nongovernmental organizations and community organizations (see Figure 1). More importantly, 
equitable benefit-sharing is imperative at the level of communities and households, which are 
the final recipients of the payment. Although there has been an emphasis on addressing the 
issues of REDD+-related benefit distribution at the international level and to some degree at 
national (or central government) level, there has been very limited analysis (if any) at the 
lowest tier of administrative hierarchy, which is usually a village, and how this may affect 
benefit-sharing within and among households.
Introduction
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1.1 Objectives of the report
This report examines two very important factors that are likely to affect benefit-sharing from 
REDD+ at a household and village or community level. These are:
1. whether benefits are provided to communities or directly to households;
2. the form in which benefits are provided – cash or in kind, or combinations of different types  
of benefit.
The paper will also look at the following design issues closely related to these two factors:
l What should the provision of benefits be based on – landholding size, actual emission reductions 
or the demography of the community – to ensure that equitable design criteria are met?
l How can it be ensured that more vulnerable groups such as ethnic minorities, the landless 
poor, women and children do not lose out?
l What impact would the type of benefit transferred have on the well-being of the communities 
and the local economy?
There is no one-size-fits-all approach to benefit distribution systems. Impacts on the well-being 
of the recipient communities or households, as well as the effectiveness, legitimacy and overall 
success of the scheme, will depend on the local context of each REDD project. Therefore, this 
paper looks at some of the factors that are very likely to affect the way benefits are shared 
or distributed at village level and will suggest benefit distribution systems that would enable 
the REDD pilot project in Cat Tien National Park, Viet Nam, to be more pro-poor. Viet Nam is 
one of 14 countries where the United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (UN-REDD) is supporting the 
development of REDD readiness. In preparing for REDD, there are several elements that need to 
be addressed: the ‘components of readiness’. Of these, the Government of Viet Nam identified 
the design of a transparent and equitable benefit distribution system as a priority for UN-REDD 
support (UN-REDD Programme Vietnam, 2009).
Note: This paper focuses on the lowest tier of administrative hierarchy (shaded area).
Figure 1. Simplified diagram of REDD+ benefit flows at international, national and 
sub-national level
Financial flows from carbon credits through bilateral or 
multilateral channels
Financial flows to REDD fund management at central  
government level
Financial flows to sub-national level
Financial flows to local government  
(the lowest tier of administrative hierarchy)
Benefit transfer to the whole community Benefit transfer directly to households
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As Madeira (2009) states, since most REDD activities are not yet fully operational, little is 
known about how they will be implemented and whether they will deliver pro-poor benefits. 
There has been very limited progress to date and the situation is still more or less the same. 
There is, however, a great deal of accumulated experience from development and conservation 
programmes such as payments for ecosystem services (PES), community-based natural resource 
management, integrated conservation and development programmes and development-
focused food/cash transfer programmes. Lessons will be drawn from those programmes 
that are relevant and applicable to REDD projects. These interventions are chosen primarily 
because (1) they are at different points on a spectrum of conditionality at the individual and 
community level, ranging from being identified as poor or most vulnerable where participants 
are compensated for providing labour inputs, through to carrying out specified conservation and 
land management practices to protect and enhance the supply of ecosystem services; and (2) 
they involve challenges of targeting – identifying the appropriate people to receive the benefits 
and ensuring that benefits are concentrated on the most appropriate to maximize poverty 
reduction impacts. 
1.2 Structure of the report
The review is divided into five sections. Section 1 has provided a brief definition of REDD+, why 
a pro-poor benefit distribution system is key to project success, the objectives of the study, and 
key design issues that may affect benefit distribution at community and household level. Section 
2 explains in detail what equitable benefit distribution means, why it matters, and the different 
criteria used to assess whether a given benefit distribution is pro-poor or not. Section 3 reviews 
the distributional implications of benefits transferred to communities or directly to households and 
draws lessons from PES. Section 4 explores the impacts of the type of benefit transferred – cash 
benefits, tangible and intangible in-kind benefits, or a mix of both – on inter- and intra-household 
benefit distribution, and their impacts on the well-being of households and the local economy 
as well. Section 5 introduces the pro-poor REDD+ pilot project in Cat Tien National Park in Viet 
Nam, draws lessons and provides sets of recommendations to ensure that the benefit distribution 
system of the pilot project is pro-poor. It also provides a summary and points a way forward.
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There is a growing need to ensure that REDD works for the poor. Beyond the moral argument, 
scholars mention the sustainability of REDD in the long term, risk reduction in projects and for 
investors and buyers, political motivation or legitimacy. Forest conservation policies that hurt the 
poor or privilege the wealthy disproportionately may not be acceptable to those who are to pay for 
REDD or to the governments in countries supplying reduced emission reductions (Börner et al., 2010).
The potential social benefits from carbon finance include new revenue streams flowing to poor 
communities, particularly in terms of increased, stable and long-term financial and non-financial 
benefit flows in rural areas, and benefits from the more efficient and sustainable land-use 
practices it supports (CARE, n.d.; Peskett et al., 2008). In practice, however, REDD systems could 
present new risks for the poor, including loss of access to land, the concentration of power by 
elites and distortion effects in local economic systems (Peskett et al., 2008). CARE adopts an 
explicitly ‘pro-poor’ approach that aims to ensure that (1) poverty reduction benefits reach poorer 
households, women and other marginalized groups within poor communities, (2) there are no 
negative social impacts or, where such impacts are inevitable, that effective mitigation measures 
are put in place to achieve a net ‘do no harm’ outcome, (3) there is equitable sharing of benefits 
between local, national and international levels, and (4) human rights are respected, protected 
and secured. Furthermore, Peskett et al. (2008) list 10 requirements for making REDD work for the 
poor (see Box 1).
Pro-poor benefit distribution:  
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Box 1. Ten requirements for making REDD work for the poor
1. Provision of information
2. Provision of upfront finance and use of mechanisms for reducing costs
3. Use of ‘soft’ enforcement and risk reduction measures
4. Prioritization of ‘pro-poor’ REDD policies and measures and long time horizons
5. Provision of technical and legal assistance to national and local governments, NGOs and the private sector
6. Maintenance of flexibility in the design of the REDD mechanism
7. Clear definition and equitable allocation of carbon rights
8. Development of social standards and application of existing extra-sectoral standards to REDD systems
9. Applying measures to improve the equity of benefit distribution
10. Alignment with international and national financial and development strategies
Adapted from Peskett et al. (2008).
There is no clear definition of pro-poor benefit distribution in REDD+. The existing literature on 
benefit distribution focuses on the following five issues:
l whether it is defined using externally derived criteria or the perceptions of the public;
l whether payments are made on the basis of equity (payments match contributions), 
equality (equal payments to all households or communities) or need (where the needy are 
systematically favoured);
l whether the basis of the payment mechanism is inputs (for example, labour and size of 
landholding) or outputs (reduced CO2 emissions) ;
l targeting – how to ensure that disadvantaged groups such as small landholders do not lose out.
REDD Working Papers
2.1 Defining pro-poor benefit distribution using externally derived criteria
Even though it seems easy to define what pro-poor means, assessing whether and to what 
extent an initiative is pro-poor is difficult in practice. How do we know whether the benefit 
distribution mechanism that we adopt really is pro-poor or not? Pagiola (2007) describes a pro-
poor intervention as a mechanism ‘that maximizes its potential positive impact and minimizes 
its potential negative impact on the poor’. According to Pernia (2003), as long as the poor 
benefit proportionally more than the non-poor, the given intervention is pro-poor in nature. 
Pernia further argues that a development strategy or an intervention that makes efficient use of 
labour – the poor’s principal asset – and makes appropriate investments in education and health 
is good for both growth and distribution.
In this paper pro-poor benefit distribution in REDD+ is defined as a mechanism that (1) ensures 
equitable participation by and consultation with the communities directly affected by the 
scheme; (2) in absolute terms delivers a positive net benefit to the poor; (3) in relative terms 
benefits the poor proportionally more than the relatively well-off; and (4) enhances and makes 
use of the poor’s primary assets, namely labour and social capital. Such externally derived 
criteria can be used to assess whether an initiative is pro-poor. However, the perceptions of 
those involved in the scheme are also important indicators.
2.2 Pro-poor benefit distribution and community perceptions
Recently, many researchers have started to examine the public’s perceptions of fairness to 
assess whether a particular scheme has been pro-poor or not. Sommerville et al. (2010) state 
that a main determinant of the acceptability of an intervention such as payments for ecosystem 
services or REDD is the perceived fairness of the distribution of the costs and benefits of the 
intervention. Taking a case study from Menabe in Madagascar, the authors investigated the 
role of perceived fairness and benefit distribution in community-based payments for ecosystem 
services interventions. Sommerville et al. (2010) found that the intervention appears to be 
an overall success, with individuals reporting high levels of perceived fairness of payment 
distribution and a high proportion of individuals expressing overall net benefit. Therefore, as well 
as providing tangible benefits, conservation success is contingent on developing positive local 
attitudes (Struhsaker et al., 2005).
Community consultations and participation in project planning and implementation processes 
can be a very effective tool to build positive perceptions among client communities. However, 
even when local people’s needs (in terms of payment types) are integrated into project 
planning and implementation, varying opportunity and transaction costs among individuals and 
communities may result in the perception of unfair distribution (Sommerville et al., 2010). The 
authors  reiterate that it is usually the case that the costs of conservation are shouldered by 
local people (mostly the poor) who depend on natural resources for their livelihood, whereas 
the benefits are enjoyed by all. Thus, an equitable distribution of benefits and costs is crucial to 
ensure the success of the intervention. This can be done by carefully assessing the transaction 
costs and opportunity costs incurred by different groups of participants and ensuring that these 
costs are equally distributed. This should mainly be done to distribute benefits in proportion 
to the costs of participation. If payments are made without carefully equating opportunity 
and the transaction costs associated with landholding size (which are not necessarily 
directly proportional to the size of the landholding), then large landholders may benefit 
disproportionately more than small landholders. As a result it is very likely that this is going to 
develop sense of injustice which is not going to serve the purpose of the intervention.
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2.3 The principles of equitable benefit distribution in REDD+
The United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation in Developing Countries has assisted the Government of Viet Nam to 
identify key issues that need to be addressed in the design of a REDD+ compliant benefit 
distribution system based on four key principles, namely: equity, transparency, additionality, and 
performance-relatedness. In making the allocation decision, authorities often use distributive 
rules such as equality (everyone receives the same amount), equity (the amount of the resource 
received matches contributions) or need (outcomes satisfy needs) (Törnblom and Vermunt, 
2007). Even though nowadays many tend to define ‘equity’ in a broader sense that encompasses 
equality and need, others (for example, Wagstaff, 1994; Maiese, 2003) emphasize that the three 
principles of distributive justice – equity, equality and need – are equally important and operate 
in different situations. Equity or proportionality operate mainly in competitive situations where 
individuality is stressed. Even though benefit distribution based on contributions makes economic 
sense, it is very likely to arouse resentment and social unrest, thereby jeopardizing social capital. 
Consequently this will undermine the effectiveness of the intervention. Equality and need, on 
the other hand, operate in situations where group solidarity, harmony and the well-being of 
individuals is the group goal. These can be categorized as social capital, which is the primary and 
most important asset of poor rural communities in many developing countries.
Therefore, in this paper it is argued that benefit distribution will depend on the nature of 
the participants in the scheme. In areas where the participants are characterized by less 
inequality, a benefit distribution system based on equity (competitiveness) and equality (equal 
opportunities to participate) would be more relevant. In contrast, in an unequal society, benefit 
distribution based on need would be more desirable so that poor or weak claimants do not 
receive disproportionately lower benefits.
2.4 What should the calculation of benefits be based on?
Although there are several proposed options for determining the amount of benefit transferred 
(per hectare of forest conserved; per ton of CO2 emissions reduced; in relation to input to 
conservation activities such as tree planting and carbon monitoring; or a mixed approach), there 
is no agreed mechanism for the calculation of benefits (commonly known as the payment 
mechanism) for REDD. This is mainly because of the potential implications of each payment 
mechanism for benefit distribution. The payment mechanism will have significant implications 
for benefit distribution, which will very probably be affected by negotiations; in particular, power 
imbalances  between ecosystem service sellers, buyers and mediators. Any mechanism needs 
to ensure that small elite groups are not over-compensated and that as many as possible small 
landholders (who are usually poor) are involved in the scheme. This becomes significantly 
important in regions or countries characterized by disparities in landholding. 
While Latin American countries are notorious for disparities between small landholders 
(minifundios) and large landholders (latifundios), many poor Asian and African countries are 
increasingly becoming so. Jayne et al. (2003) conducted a household survey in Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Rwanda, Mozambique and Zambia and found serious disparities in incomes and land allocation 
at the local level in all five countries. They argue that, although it is possible that village-level 
disparities in incomes and land could occur as an outgrowth of differences in capabilities and 
entrepreneurship across households, it is also possible that local and national governance 
decisions over time play a role in generating such disparities. This trend is becoming increasingly 
common in Viet Nam as well. According to Nguyen et al. (2006), land inequality in Viet Nam is 
widening, where the poor households often have small areas of agricultural land. Thus, it is very 
important for the Vietnamese government to carefully design a benefit distribution system that 
does not exclude weak claimants.
10
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2.5 Targeting: How to ensure that small landholders or landless groups do not 
lose out
It is becoming more apparent that REDD+ benefits transfers are very likely to be made according 
to the size of landholding conserved or the amount of CO2 reduced, or to be based on a quasi-
auction where buyers and sellers negotiate (Börner et al., 2010). However, owing to the high 
transaction costs involved in basing payments on outputs (reduced CO2 emissions) and in quasi-
auctions, many REDD+ projects are very likely to use landholding size dedicated to REDD+ as the 
basis for payment.
Making benefit transfers on the basis of reduced emissions is going to be more challenging in 
Viet Nam. According to Bleaney et al. (2009), monitoring carbon storage at the household level 
is difficult because of the sheer number of households managing forests in Viet Nam and limited 
capacity. This may make it difficult to distribute benefits below the provincial level on the basis 
of ‘pay per performance’. If individual households are rewarded in proportion to the size of their 
landholding, then large landholders may benefit disproportionately more than small landholders, 
and landless but forest-dependent community members will be excluded. This will raise equity 
issues in regions experiencing land disparity such as Viet Nam. In these circumstances, it is 
desirable to engage the landless poor in monitoring and assessment activities and to pay them 
for their labour. This would enable the landless poor to benefit from the scheme.
In addition, the transaction and perhaps opportunity costs of participating in REDD+ are 
negatively proportional to landholding size. This means that large landholders are going 
to benefit from economies of scale of production and will disproportionately benefit much 
more than the poor. What can be done to overcome this problem? As argued by Schwarte 
and Mohammed (2011), to distribute the costs of and benefits from participation more fairly, 
schemes could provide a declining reward for each additional unit of land. This would result 
in diminishing payment as landholding size increases. In this way, participation by small 
landholders is encouraged while ensuring that large landholders do not rip off the benefits 
associated with REDD+. The same approach was used in Ecuador in an incentive-based 
programme for the conservation of native forests called Programa Socio Bosque.1 
1. See http://www.scribd.com/doc/16445485/Programa-Socio-Bosque (accessed 5 December 2011).
11
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Should benefits be transferred to 
households or to the community 
as a whole?
For the sake of simplicity, development practitioners and donor organizations have for a long 
time taken the household (as opposed to the individual) as the utility-maximizing unit. This 
simply means that household members make decisions together and try to maximize their 
household welfare. This is based on the assumption that households are characterized by unity 
and agreement, which has been proved to be wrong. Nonetheless, benefit transfer programmes 
usually take households as a unit and make payments accordingly. Some interventions have been 
seen to magnify this assumption at the community level and to take a community as a unit. 
In natural resource conservation programmes, it is preferred to reward communities where the 
natural resource is communally owned. In addition, it is argued that contracting with and providing 
benefits to communities as a whole has the advantage of economies of scale and thus lower 
transaction costs. However, benefits provided to households or to communities will have varying 
implications for benefit distribution. In this section, experiences are reviewed from payments for 
ecosystem services (PES) and the implications for benefit distribution of benefits provided directly 
to households or to the community as a whole (for a definition of PES, see Box 2).
3.1 Lessons from payments for ecosystem services
PES is based on the notion that, to maintain the supply of environmental goods and services, 
immediate incentives are needed to induce people to forgo the more disruptive land-use and 
resource-use practices (Frost and Bond, 2006).
PES is, arguably, the most promising innovation in conservation since the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (Wunder, 2005). It has 
attracted increasing interest from both policymakers and researchers as a mechanism to translate 
external, non-market values of the environment into financial incentives for local actors to provide 
ecosystem services (Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, 2008). In addition to conservation benefits, PES 
arguably has the advantage of providing additional income sources for poor land users, helping 
3
Box 2. Defining payments for ecosystem services
Wunder (2005) defines PES as (1) a voluntary transaction where (2) a well-defined ecosystem service or a 
land use likely to ensure that the service (3) is being ‘bought’ by a minimum of one ecosystem service buyer 
(4) from a minimum of one ecosystem provider (5) if and only if the ecosystem service provider secures 
ecosystem service provision (conditionality). As can be noted from this definition, compared with command-
and-control and other disincentive-based environmental policies, the PES concept has two innovative features: 
voluntariness, which makes the scheme at least welfare neutral for those who participate voluntarily; and 
conditionality, where payments are provided contingent on the agreed increased environmental service 
provisioning compared with a business-as-usual scenario (Börner et al., 2010). However, not all PES schemes 
comply with Wunder’s criteria (Porras, Grieg-Gran and Neves, 2008).
A number of PES schemes are being experimented with in Viet Nam (Hoang et al., 2008) but, according to 
Wunder et al. (2005), they do not fall within their definition of PES. In particular, the issue of voluntariness on 
the buyer side seems to be missing. The recently drafted and approved Payments for Forest Environmental 
Services (PFES) Decree No. 99/2010/ND-CP (see http://epronews.com/en-US/Document/Details.aspx?ID=105) 
issued by Viet Nam’s Prime Minister states that all ecosystem service buyers, which range from governmental 
companies to downstream water users, are ‘obliged’ to pay for the services they receive.
12
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to improve their livelihoods. However, as highlighted earlier, this will very likely depend on 
how benefits are provided. Decisions on whether to provide benefits at the community or the 
household level often depend on (1) careful assessment of the pros and cons of each mode of 
benefit transfer, and (2) the availability of the resources to be distributed and eligibility.
3.1.1 The pros and cons of providing benefits to communities vs. directly to households
The provision of benefits to communities (rather than directly to households) often takes one 
of two forms. Either they are implemented as predetermined development interventions or 
financial resources are provided to communities and they decide how to distribute or what to 
build in their community.
Tacconi (2009) state three advantages of investing in community infrastructure – whether this 
is decided by communities or through predetermined development programmes – to be: (1) it 
reduces transaction costs, which are a major barrier to the participation of the poorest in PES 
schemes; (2) it builds the institutional capacity of local communities and thereby strengthens 
their social capital; and (3) by supporting community infrastructure and services it establishes 
longer-lasting foundations for the improvement of local livelihoods.
It is also commonly believed that benefits directed at building community infrastructures allow 
all community members to benefit from the payments generated from PES. Sommerville et 
al. (2010) argue that a focus on benefit provision to communities as a whole and investing in 
community infrastructure could potentially ensure that the entire community has the opportunity 
to access the benefits, and may avert benefit capture by small elite groups and guarantee 
access to the poor. There is growing evidence to suggest that payments made to communities, 
whether they are implemented by an intermediary organization or communities are provided 
with financial resources and decide how to use the money, are usually invested in building 
community infrastructures such as roads, schools and hospitals.
However, PES incentives that are directed at whole communities for communal participation 
may not be effective because this relies on the assumption that the community is unified. 
It cannot be expected that everyone in the community will benefit equally (Skutsch et al., 
2011). Therefore, one needs to bear in mind that projects aiming at developing community 
infrastructure are not always immune to elite capture. The location of schools and clinics, for 
example, is usually selected in favour of the elite. It is also common in many development 
projects for the elite to claim de facto ownership of the public goods and to exclude weak 
claimants from benefiting from the resource.
3.1.2 Resource availability and eligibility
In addition to the distributional, administrative and livelihood benefits that are often associated 
with providing benefits to communities as a whole, the financial resources available are very 
likely to affect the decision-making process. If the financial resources available to be distributed 
are very limited in relation to the number of eligible and willing participants, then the incentives 
provided to each household might not be large enough.
In a study by González Guillen (2004) to assess the importance of cash payments in the 
Mexican PES programme, and documented in All That Glitters by Porras, Grieg-Gran and Neves 
(2008), in areas where communities received relatively large payments these were more likely 
to be distributed between community members. On the other hand, a community in Santa 
Maria de Ocotan and Xoconostle in Durango state received US$72,000 to be shared between 
18,000 households, which is equivalent to US$4 each. In this case the payment was not shared 
out but was invested in publicly owned goods. In theory it is very likely that the perceived 
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value of benefits transferred to communities is higher than that of small or negligible benefits 
transferred to each household. Therefore, investing in community infrastructures that can be 
enjoyed by all can be an effective way of incentivizing people to change their natural resource 
use behaviour.
Sometimes there can be a mix of both direct transfers to households and payments made 
collectively to communities. An example of such a scheme is the Bolsa Floresta (forest 
allowance) Program in the state of Amazonas in Brazil (see Box 3). The Bolsa Floresta Program 
provides payments and social benefits to every household in a reserve that agrees to be part 
of the scheme regardless of its primary income-generating activity. For example, a fisher 
household and a household primarily dependent on agriculture or selling forest products are 
both eligible and receive the same compensation.2 This may seem generous and to be providing 
equal opportunities to all members of the communities in the reserve, but the efficacy of 
the programme could be undermined. Such blanket distribution of benefits to everyone in a 
village or community tends to lower the benefits per household, which weakens the social 
objective of the scheme as well. Instead of providing benefits simply on the basis of belonging 
to a community, landless community members and those who are less dependent on the 
forest ecosystem for their livelihood could be hired as labour in the scheme’s conservation or 
monitoring activities, such as carbon and biodiversity monitoring and tree planting.
2. This information is obtained from the Fundação Amazonas Sustentável (the Amazonas Sustainable Foundation), the 
NGO that implements the Bolsa Floresta Program in the Amazonas, based on a recent survey to assess the public’s 
perceptions of the Program. 
Box 3. The Bolsa Floresta Program, Brazil
The Bolsa Floresta (forest allowance) Program is a voluntary programme to reduce deforestation and promote 
sustainable development by rewarding the communities of the Amazon for conserving it (Parker and Cranford, 
2010). The programme has four components that encourage the sustainable use of forests:
1. The Bolsa Floresta Income promotes sustainable production of non-timber forest products such as nuts 
and vegetable oil and aims to improve the efficiency of production chains. The payment is not made 
directly to households, but is part of community investment. All activities that do not cause deforestation 
are eligible for this allowance. 
2. The Bolsa Floresta Social supports infrastructure improvements related to education, health, 
communication and transportation and aims to break the cycle of deforestation by providing key services 
that would otherwise be financed by converting tropical forests to other uses. This package provides 
financial support equivalent to US$200 per family per year. 
3. The Bolsa Floresta Family provides direct payments of US$25 per month per household. Payments are 
made to the mothers of families living in protected areas that agree to a zero deforestation goal. 
4. The Bolsa Floresta Association aims to strengthen community-based organizations in the region. This 
package provides additional financial support equivalent to 10 per cent of the amount paid to all families 
registered in Bolsa Floresta Family in each reserve.
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3.2 Lessons learned
Although many proponents of direct payments to households argue that this requires less 
institutional capacity and no sustained flow of funds for maintenance; it is believed that investing 
in community infrastructures through payments to communities is arguably less vulnerable to 
elite capture. In addition to the potential benefits that either distribution mode provides, project 
designers and developers may need to carefully assess the amount of financial resources available 
per participant. If there are too many eligible and willing participants, then providing benefits 
directly to households might dilute the incentives provided and undermine the effectiveness of the 
scheme. In that case, investing in community infrastructures that can be enjoyed by all can be an 
effective way of incentivizing people to change their natural resource use behaviour. If sufficient 
funds are available and the participants prefer benefit provision directly to households, then the 
decision on whether to make transfers in cash or in kind is also crucial.
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Should benefits to households be 
distributed in cash or in kind? 
If it is decided that benefits are to be transferred to households rather than invested in public 
infrastructures, it is still much debated, now more than ever, whether to transfer the benefits in 
cash or in kind. Though no distinction is made between the different forms of in-kind benefit, 
Garfinkel (1970) made one of the first attempts to take account of beneficiary preferences in 
the analysis of the efficiency of cash or in-kind payments. A proposed payment type could 
be effective, efficient and technically and politically feasible; however, according to Garfinkel, 
beneficiaries’ preferences should be brought to the forefront of the analysis. This section goes 
beyond looking at the public’s preferences to explore lessons from payments for ecosystem 
services (PES), community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) and integrated 
conservation and development projects (ICDPs), and food/cash transfer programmes. Examined 
are (1) the implications of cash and in-kind benefit distribution; and (2) the potential impacts on 
the well-being of the households participating in the scheme of other exogenous factors such 
as administrative costs, vulnerability to corruption and looting, consumption sovereignty or the 
ability to choose, and distortions of the local economy.
4.1 Lessons from payments for ecosystem services
In PES, direct payments to households are usually made in cash, in kind (tangible or intangible) 
or in a mix of both cash and kind. Examples of direct cash payment schemes include the Costa 
Rican PSA (Pagos por Servicios Ambientales – a Spanish version of PES). In the Los Negros valley 
in Bolivia, a PES scheme involves the simultaneous purchase of two environmental services. The 
United States Fish and Wildlife Service is paying for the protection of habitat for migratory bird 
species, while downstream irrigators in the municipality of Pampagrande are paying to conserve 
the same upland forest and puna vegetation which is thought to help maintain water supplies in 
the dry season (Asquith, Vargas and Wunder, 2008).
4
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In the following sub-sections the documented advantages and disadvantages of each type of 
benefit in PES schemes will be explored, including whether the preferences of the participant 
communities or households are asssessed just once or periodically. Periodic assessments are 
mainly to take account of changes in preferences for a specific type of benefit, which often vary 
with experience (participation in the scheme) and unprecedented climatic and economic situations.
4.1.1 The pros and cons of cash vs. in-kind benefit distribution in PES
Empirical evidence assessing the advantages and disadvantages of each type of benefit 
distribution in a PES scheme is available from the Los Negros scheme in Bolivia. Robertson 
and Wunder (2005) interviewed local people to investigate the perceived advantages and 
disadvantages of the current in-kind (non-financial) payments versus hypothetical financial 
or cash alternatives. The PES recipients in Santa Rosa (Bolivia) specifically rejected the option 
of payments in cash. The main reasons are summarized in Table 1. Proponents of in-kind 
payments usually argue that they can be a more lasting benefit because cash payments are 
more vulnerable to rapid spending. On the other hand, proponents of cash payments argue 
that they allow participants greater flexibility in the use of resources, more readily replace 
(temporary or permanent) loss of income resulting from complying with the introduced land-
use changes and are less prone to being seen as paternalistic (FAO, 2010).
Table 1. Locally perceived advantages and disadvantages of two PES payment modes in 
Santa Rosa: Financial and non-financial transfers compared
Beehive	pros Cash	pros
Cash is spent rapidly and leaves no long-run benefits Lack of both skill and interest in beekeeping leads to 
the loss of benefits
Cash feels more like giving up property rights Beehives are difficult assets to sell, compared with 
animals or equipment
Honey is a useful subsistence product Beehives are inflexible assets in terms of subdivision
Beekeeping includes an incentive to protect the forest 
as a bee habitat
Beekeeping involves extra costs, such as training and 
labour inputs
Source: Asquith, Vargas and Wunder (2008). 
According to Asquith, Vargas and Wunder (2008), non-financial transfers such as beehives in 
Bolivia have allowed participation by disadvantaged groups and have had livelihood impacts. 
Through a trickle-down effect, the scheme has activity-enhancing effects that benefit the 
landless in a variety of ways. Some PES participants have sold beehives to landless people 
specializing in apiculture; one landless worker is employed by the initiative to undertake 
hydrological measurements; another has been hired by the farmers as a roving bee expert 
who helps with hive management; and other farmers are hiring landless community 
members to help with honey processing. Moreover, according to Heyman and Ariely (2004), 
psychological research shows that low-value non-financial payments can be more effective 
than low-value cash payments in stimulating effort, since recipients are more likely to view 
non-financial transfers as compatible with reciprocal exchange in a local economy where cash 
is rarely used.
Nonetheless, some scholars and development practitioners tend to favour cash over in-kind 
redistribution because of the associated problem of indivisibility with in-kind transfers. Money 
is thought of as the most finely divisible good. The more divisible an item is, the more likely 
it is that it will allow equitable benefit-sharing among recipient households and communities. 
The problem of indivisibility is even bigger if intangible in-kind benefits are distributed. In an 
emerging scheme in Sumberjaya, Sumatra, Indonesia, intangible in-kind benefits have been 
offered to farmers to legalize their land tenure situation. This has very valuable multiplier 
effects by freeing them from the fear of eviction and allowing them to access social services 
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such as health and education (FAO, 2010). However, there are instances where the issue 
of indivisibility becomes less of a problem for some in-kind benefits too. In Bolivia’s PES 
for example, the indivisibility of a beehive has not been a constraint. Farmers with smaller 
conservation plots simply contract to undertake conservation for longer periods to maintain 
an equivalent payment. For example, 5 hectares conserved for 2 years is considered to be 
equivalent to 1 hectare of land conserved for 10 years; in both cases, the farmer would 
simply receive one beehive (Asquith, Vargas and Wunder, 2008).
4.1.2 One-time vs. periodic assessment of preferences
Even though payment types are decided through a consultative approach that takes the 
preferences of the recipient households and communities into account, human preferences 
do change over time. Communities that lack experience of receiving rewards in return for 
ecosystem service provision are less likely to express their preferences accurately. Especially 
in areas where people have limited experience or have never been part of a benefit 
transfer programme, communities are very likely to express their preferences by trial and 
error. Moreover, preferences are usually influenced by short-term experiences and thus are 
very likely to change as situations change. Therefore, it would not be sufficient to assess 
preferences only once (often just before the start of the scheme) when deciding how to 
make the payments. Some flexibility should be allowed and preferences should be assessed 
periodically (for example annually). This would permit participants in the scheme to learn 
from experience and change their expressed preferences.
A good example of a scheme that allowed such flexibility is the Sloping Land Conversion 
Program in China. At the beginning, the programme stipulated that farmers who converted 
degraded and highly sloping cropland back to either ecological forests, economic forests 
or grassland would be compensated with (a) an annual in-kind subsidy of grain, (b) a cash 
subsidy and (c) free seedlings, provided to the farmer at the beginning of the planting period. 
However, in 2004 the payment structure shifted to the provision of seedlings and payments 
made wholly in cash (Bennett, 2008).
The Fundação Amazonas Sustentável (FAS),3 in collaboration with the International Institute 
for Environment and Development, has just completed a survey assessing the perceptions 
and preferences of the participants in the Bolsa Floresta Program in relation to the different 
allowances three years after the scheme started. This is being done to allow changes in the 
components of the allowances in response to the participants’ preferences.
4.1.3 Lessons learned
In summary, the decision on whether to make payments in cash or in kind should primarily 
be based on participants’ preferences. If recipients have no any particular preference for one 
payment type over another, then the benefits associated with both cash and in-kind payments 
need to be carefully weighed and assessed. Although cash payments are finely divisible 
and do not violate consumer sovereignty, the issue of indivisibility associated with in-kind 
payments can be made less problematic by systematically factoring in the temporal value 
of the cash equivalence of the in-kind payment. Moreover, benefits associated with in-kind 
payments can trickle down to non-participant landless farmers. The distribution of beehives 
in the Bolivian PES mentioned above perfectly exemplifies the trickle-down effect of in-kind 
payments. Finally, because preferences for payment types are unlikely to be accurate, it is 
recommended that periodic assessments of preferences are undertaken to allow reasonable 
flexibility to change the payment type over time.4
3. The Amazonas Sustainable Foundation is the NGO that implements the Bolsa Floresta Program in the state of Amazonas.
4. Many of the lessons were drawn from the Los Negros scheme in Bolivia for two main reasons: (1) unlike schemes 
that provide one-off in-kind benefits, the Los Negros scheme makes a periodic in-kind payment with some form of 
conditionality; and (2) this solves the common indivisibility problem associated with in-kind benefits.
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4.2 Lessons from integrated conservation and development projects and 
community-based natural resource management
Conservation in developing nations has in the past emphasized indirect approaches such as 
ICDPs and CBNRM to maintain biodiversity (Ferraro and Kiss, 2002). The two approaches, 
which are synonymous (Chapin, 2004), have been some of the most pervasive paradigms for 
conservation in the tropics over the past 20 years (Blom, Sunderland and Murdiyarso, 2010). 
ICDPs use three main approaches (Fisher et al., 2008):
l compensation: building community infrastructures such as schools, clinics and roads to 
compensate for benefits forgone when protected areas are established;
l alternatives: reducing pressure on the environment through agricultural intensification or 
livelihood alternatives;
l enhancement: increasing the value of the natural area itself through developing previously 
unexplored markets or through ecotourism.
Many REDD schemes are very likely to be similar to ICDPs by providing incentives to reduce 
unsustainable land-use practices. These incentives are very likely to aim at providing alternatives 
and enhancement to reduce the pressure on natural resources in order to control leakage. For 
example, the Bolsa Floresta Program in the state of Amazonas – widely known as a PES or REDD 
scheme – has the characteristics of both PES (it provides direct incentives) and ICDPs (it provides 
livelihood alternatives). This makes the experiences from ICDPs and also CBNRM very relevant 
for REDD+ designs. Thus, this echoes Blom, Sunderland and Murdiyarso (2010), who argue 
that the lessons accumulated by these schemes will be essential tools for designing effective, 
efficient and equitable REDD projects. The authors warn that, if REDD fails to draw on the vast 
experiences of ICDPs, they are likely to succumb to some of the pitfalls and weaknesses that 
have dogged ICDPs for over 20 years.
4.2.1 The pros and cons of ICDPs/CBNRM
Among the early detractors of ICDPs and proponents of direct incentive mechanisms, Ferraro and 
Kiss (2002) argue against ICDP-type indirect mechanisms for three main reasons: (1) a complex 
community investment requires a more complex institutional capacity for its implementation 
than does a direct incentive mechanism, and this capacity may be lacking in the ‘global south’; 
(2) direct payments benefit poor farmers by improving cash flows, providing a fungible store of 
wealth and diversifying sources of household income, and landholders or resource users decide 
how best to meet their own goals and aspirations, rather than being subsidized to carry out 
predetermined activities, as is the case under the indirect approach; and (3) indirect approaches 
are likely to require a sustained flow of funds over time, which makes them undesirable.
However, Johannesen (2006)) indicates that some ICDP and CBNRM programmes have been 
successful in creating jobs by stimulating increased productivity in the agricultural sector, which, 
according to the definition of pro-poor benefit distribution given in this report, is a highly 
desirable attribute. Nonetheless, agricultural productivity improvements may not necessarily 
be a solution for conservation. Johannesen argues that it depends on whether the crop is land 
intensive or labour intensive. With fixed land endowments, an increased price for land-intensive 
output is likely to reduce the labour demand for farming and hence increase resource extraction, 
leading to deforestation and forest degradation. Thus, it is desirable that labour-intensive 
agricultural productivity is promoted.
Job creation could be one of the most preferred interventions by the local communities in 
and around Cat Tien National Park (CTNP) in Viet Nam. In a survey conducted in CTNP by 
Petheram and Campbell (2010), it was evident that many respondents preferred an increase 
in job opportunities. As discussed earlier, by creating jobs, REDD projects could make efficient 
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use of labour, which is the primary asset of the poor. Job creation can be promoted through 
the introduction of labour-intensive agricultural productivity and/or by getting local people to 
participate in forest monitoring activities. There is no agreed mechanism for deciding whether 
participants should be paid on the basis of performance (amount of CO2 emissions reduced or 
hectares of land conserved) or inputs (where community members engage in forest monitoring 
and reporting). Skutsch et al. (2011) argue that involving local communities in forest monitoring 
activities can be the most cost-effective alternative.
4.2.2 Participation, targeting and equity
Although ICDPs inherently seek to redistribute the costs and benefits associated with natural 
resource management, Hughes and Flintan (2001: 9) admit that, for most ICDPs, little 
information is available on the distribution of benefits between different stakeholder groups, 
such as minority ethnic groups, women or those displaced by the establishment of protected 
areas. However, some studies suggest that levels of participation and appropriate targeting of 
the participants have an effect on the equity and effectiveness of the intervention.
As in many conservation interventions, there is evidence that community consultation and 
participation are key to project outcomes in CBNRM and ICDP projects. Preece et al. (2009), for 
instance, found that preliminary analyses of ICDPs in the lower Mekong region suggest that 
community participation and consultation are associated with better conservation outcomes. 
However, community consultation and participation processes, as in many other schemes such 
as PES, can be very costly and time consuming. Higher costs can be translated into fewer 
resources (benefits) to be distributed to participating households and communities. The cost of 
participation is believed to be higher in economically and socially diverse communities, which 
are common in the rural areas of many developing countries. In their review of CBNRM in 
Botswana, Van der Jagt et al. support this argument by stating that, the less homogeneous the 
community, the more difficult it is to obtain consensus:
Not all areas in Botswana have the same natural resource base, nor are communities 
socio-economically homogenous. What has worked in northern Botswana may be difficult 
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in other parts of Botswana. Preferences and priorities of communities will vary from area 
to area, depending on lifestyle, culture, location, history, levels of education and material 
well being . . . In general, the more homogeneous a community, in terms of ethnicity 
and class, the easier it is for the community to agree on a management structure, 
management plans, use of benefits, etc. The more diverse the community, the longer it 
takes to obtain consensus. (2000: 8, 28)
Therefore, even though many academics have a greater and justifiable preference for 
community consultation, it should be acknowledged that this is going to require a substantial 
input of financial resources that would otherwise have been transferred to the communities or 
households. This should not be interpreted as participation and community consultation should 
be compromised for lower transaction costs. Instead, efforts should be made to reduce the 
transaction costs associated with community participation and consultation. One way of reducing 
these costs could be the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) such as local 
radio stations to communicate the design of the project and to allow participants to express 
their opinions. ICTs can thus potentially offer practical hands-on solutions to reduce the cost of 
participation and consultation.
Many studies have found that inappropriate targeting is one of the main problems in several 
ICDPs. Hughes and Flintan (2001: 9), in their review of experiences from ICDPs, found that 
‘ICDPs, which base their implementation on social units that are “inappropriate” to local and 
traditional forms of social organisation, may not achieve the required level of participation. 
This can lead to problems of equity over access to resources or benefits accruing from the ICDP 
projects.’ Therefore, careful targeting of the social groups that are the main threat to ecosystem 
conservation and disadvantaged groups is crucial to make sure that benefits are equitably 
distributed or, in other words, that weak claimants such as ethnic minorities and women do not 
lose out.
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4.2.3 Lessons learned
The lessons learned from ICDPs/CBNRM that have direct implications for the equitable 
distribution of benefits can be summarized as follows:
l REDD schemes are very likely to take some form of ICDP by providing alternatives to reduce 
the stress on ecosystems through job creation. Job creation through the promotion of labour-
intensive agricultural productivity should be pursued, rather than a land-intensive production 
system, which may reduce labour demand. Making use of the labour of local communities in 
carbon and biodiversity monitoring can also be a cost-effective way of creating jobs.
l Participation is key to the success of conservation programmes but can be very costly. 
Therefore innovative ways to reduce the cost of participation should be introduced, such as 
the use of ICTs (for example, local radio stations).
l Appropriate targeting of participants in the scheme is crucial. The key to project success and 
to ensuring that marginalized or disadvantaged groups do not lose out is to target social 
units that are (a) the main threats to ecosystem conservation and (b) appropriate to local and 
traditional forms of social organization.
4.3 Lessons from cash and food transfer programmes
Cash or food transfer programmes have been important aspects of rural public works in many low-
income countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The main differences between such transfer 
programmes depend on whether they are provided with or without conditionality (see Table 
2). Experiences from cash or food programmes are well documented and there are a significant 
number of lessons to be learned that are relevant to REDD. They are relevant to REDD because:
l REDD projects may aim to ensure that the poor benefit from the scheme as a preventive 
measure against leakage rather than as a system where the benefits provided to the poor 
are precisely calculated on the basis of their emission reductions or the land area conserved. 
These development programmes provide lessons on how to distribute benefits to the poorest.
l Some REDD pilot projects have applied similar approaches from this experience. For example, 
the widely acclaimed Bolsa Floresta Program in the state of Amazonas was inspired by the 
Bolsa Familia (family allowance) – the Brazilian government’s social welfare programme, 
which provides financial assistance to poor families in return for their children attending 
school and getting vaccinated.
l Food-for-work or cash-for-work programmes can shed light on how intra-household benefit 
distribution can be affected by each type of transfer.
Table 2. Food and cash transfer programmes
Source: Extracted from Rogers and Coates (2002), unless indicated otherwise.
Type	of	programme	 Definition	 Examples
Food for work Provides food rations in exchange for a given 
amount of work such as terracing and road 
construction, often to protect poor households 
against the decline in purchasing power and to 
relieve deprivation
Food for work programme in Ethiopia aimed at 
rehabilitation of forest, grazing and agricultural 
lands
Cash for work Provides cash in exchange for a given amount of 
work such as terracing and road construction
Cash for work project in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo aimed at supporting the resettlement 
of displaced and war-affected people in DRC 
(Guluma, 2004)
Conditional cash 
transfers for the poor
Provides cash payments to poor households that 
meet certain behavioural requirements such as 
sending children to school 
Mexico’s Progresa provides cash in exchange for 
regular school attendance, health clinic visits and 
nutritional support
Conditional food 
transfers for the poor
Provides food supplements or subsidies to 
poor households that meet certain behavioural 
requirements
Food for education programme in Bangladesh 
– conditional transfer of food to poor families that 
was designed to increase school attendance
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4.3.1 Impacts on intra-household benefit distribution
There has been very little evidence, if any, on in-kind (food) transfers and increased nutritional 
intakes by participating households. Ahmed et al. (2009) compared food and cash transfers to 
the ultra poor in Bangladesh and provide a clear explanation of the impact of each transfer type 
on benefit-sharing within a household depending on age group, gender and food type. They 
found that participation by an adult female does not lead to increased caloric intakes by pre-
school children. They reported that the benefits from cash transfers in terms of increased caloric 
intake appear to be evenly shared between men and women. Similarly, Cunha, De Giorgi and 
Jayachandran (2010) evaluated the nutritional intake and health of young children (aged 0–6) 
under transfers in cash and in kind (beans, sugar and oil, for example) among the people covered 
by the Programa de Apoyo Alimentario (PAL) in Mexico. The study found that there is little 
evidence overall of differential caloric and nutritional intakes under in-kind and cash transfers.
In Bangladesh, however, a further analysis among those who received food payments found 
that the type of food transferred affects the distribution of benefits within a household. 
According to Ahmed et al. (2009), food interventions that provide rice have a greater effect 
on men’s caloric intake relative to women, whereas the opposite is true for an intervention 
that provides the less-favoured atta flour, the main ingredient of most varieties of bread in the 
Indian subcontinent. The use of a less-preferred food type (atta) increases the share of food that 
goes to women relative to men. Even though REDD participants rarely (if ever) receive food as 
compensation, this still indicates that the type of in-kind benefit is very likely to affect benefit 
transfers between household members.
A cash-for-work programme in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) established by 
the Save the Children (UK) Food Security and Livelihoods programme aimed to support the 
resettlement of displaced and war-affected people in the DRC (Guluma, 2004). The programme 
gave priority to livelihood insecurity over food security and decided to inject cash into the 
local economy. In an assessment of how the cash was allocated within the household in this 
programme, it was found that approximately half of the cash received was used directly by 
the household, and the other half was used by the husband, mainly for gifts, to pay debts or 
for unproductive consumption such as beer. In a few cases, women did not receive any money 
from their husbands. Those who used the money for direct household expenditure put the cash 
towards the purchase of items such as salt, soap, clothes for the wife and children and foodstuffs 
such as palm oil and dried fish; many others paid school fees for their children, purchased 
livestock and paid other health costs. Very interestingly, according to Guluma’s report some 
women mentioned that they were able to get credit because of the increased reliability within 
the community owing to their husband’s involvement in stable and official work contracts.
4.3.2 The cost-effectiveness of food and cash transfers
In addition to the distributional impact of the types of benefit transferred, the costs involved in 
each transfer type and method should be considered carefully. Many studies suggest that food 
or other in-kind transfers cost substantially more than cash transfers. In a maternal and child 
health programme in Honduras, it cost 1.03 lempiras to deliver 1 lempira of income transfer 
in the form of a coupon, whereas it cost 5.69 lempiras to deliver the same income transfer in 
the form of food.5 In a similar study conducted to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of the PAL 
programme in Mexico, Cunha, De Giorgi and Jayachandran (2010) found that in-kind transfers 
are likely to have greater distribution costs than cash transfers. The PAL in-kind basket costs at 
least 20 per cent more to administer than the cash transfer. The author argues that the policy 
debate over transfers of equal value in cash and in kind must, therefore, consider the differences 
5. The lempira is the currency of Honduras; in December 2011, the exchange rate was 18.91 lempiras to US$1.
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in costs of these two approaches. Echoing Cunha’s finding, Guluma (2004) asserts that the cost 
of carrying out cash-for-work projects is significantly less than that for food-for-work projects; in 
the latter case, most of the additional costs arise from transport and storage fees.
However, one of the lingering problems of cash-for-work programmes is that they suffer from 
inflationary pressures (Rogers and Coates, 2002). Usually, when the economy is hit by inflation 
and consumer price rises, the value of the cash paid by the projects drops; this disincentivizes 
participants and they usually abandon the project. This phenomenon was seen in the cash-
for-work programme in the DRC. Whereas many employers responded to inflation and the 
consequent consumer price increases by increasing wages to labourers, the rigidity of the 
project, which is common in many development projects, did not allow any flexibility. As a 
result, many of those involved lacked motivation and abandoned the project. Therefore, if REDD 
projects decide to make payments in cash or in kind, the following factors need to be taken into 
consideration: (1) at a national level, the country’s macroeconomic stability and whether the 
country can contain inflationary pressures, and (2) at a project level, should cash payments be 
favoured, contingency plans to increase payment levels in the event of inflation occurring.
Although in-kind transfers make sense when the benefit is needed to be shared by members 
of the household who have no decision-making power (usually women and children), this may 
potentially violate consumer sovereignty. As a result, according to Faminow (1995) recipients 
may perceive their well-being as being lower than it would have been, because in-kind or food 
transfers force them to consume a different bundle of goods and services than if equivalent 
dollar cash payments had been provided. As discussed earlier in this paper, recipients’ 
perceptions are a very important measure of well-being and therefore a negative perception of 
well-being by recipients can potentially make the intervention counterproductive.
The pros and cons of cash vs. food transfers are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3. Pros and cons of cash vs. food transfers
Pro-food,	con-cash Pro-cash,	con-food
If carefully selected, certain food types may have a 
distributional impact by increasing nutritional intakes 
by women and children
Food transfers do not generally increase the nutritional 
intake of participating households
Cash is more susceptible to unproductive consumption, 
usually by male household heads
Food transfers incur high administrative and 
distribution costs compared with cash transfers
Cash suffers from inflationary pressure whereas food 
transfers do not 
In-kind transfers in general and food in particular 
could encroach upon consumers’ ability to purchase 
anything they wish 
4.3.3 Benefit transfer types and changes in household consumption bundles
Rural or poor communities usually face relatively more stringent budget constraints to meet 
their demands for basic necessities such as food, clothing and shelter. To reduce poverty, it 
makes sense to provide cash payments to rural and poor households to help ease their budget 
constraints. Thus many scholars confidently argue in favour of cash transfers or payments as 
a means of reducing poverty. The household will have more financial resources to spend on 
different bundles of goods of its choosing; thus it can maximize its welfare. In contrast, with in-
kind payments the project designer specifies some of the bundle of goods that the ecosystem 
service provider will receive. As a result, the ecosystem service provider will probably be less 
well off than if cash had been provided, because the same resources would have been allocated 
in a way that – for them – was not necessarily optimal. In this case, one can easily conclude that 
cash payments are more effective than non-monetary payments. This is effective in the sense 
that cash payments can satisfy the recipient and thereby lead to successful outcomes.
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However, this may not hold true in some circumstances. When ecosystem service sellers reside 
in a remote and not easily accessible area and cash is rarely used to buy consumable goods, 
then in-kind payments are more likely to be preferred. Thus, the decision on whether to provide 
cash or in-kind payments should involve a clear understanding of the way the local market 
functions and whether cash is commonly used to buy basic necessities.
4.3.4 Benefit transfer types and effects on the local economy
It is widely believed that different payment types are very likely to have varying impacts on 
the local economy. Cunha, De Giorgi and Jayachandran (2010) examine how cash and in-kind 
transfers into small, partially closed economies (villages) affect prices, and they hypothesize 
that cash transfers increase demand for normal goods, causing prices to rise. Non-financial or 
in-kind transfers generate a similar increase in demand, but they also increase supply. Therefore, 
relative to financial transfers, non-financial or in-kind transfers should lead to lower prices. This 
can be perceived as a positive outcome if the ecosystem service sellers are consumers but not 
producers. If they are producers and the intervention is leading to a decline in commodity prices, 
this will have a negative impact on their well-being.
Cunha, De Giorgi and Jayachandran (2010) took the case of a transfer programme for poor 
households in rural Mexico that randomly assigned villages to receive in-kind food transfers, 
cash transfers of equivalent value or no transfers at all. They found that the price decline in 
villages receiving in-kind food transfers increased the programme’s net transfer by 12 per cent 
for a recipient who is a consumer of food. On the other hand, the price increase in villages 
receiving cash reduced the real value of the transfer for the recipients by 11 per cent. They 
conclude that choosing non-financial (in-kind) rather than financial (cash) transfers generates 
extra indirect transfers to the poor that are worth 23 per cent of the direct transfer itself. This 
explanation holds true in a closed or semi-closed economic system. It is assumed that local 
economies in remote rural areas are partially or semi-closed and the means of communication 
such as telephones and access by road are limited. Therefore, this explanation is specific to the 
local context. In easily accessible areas and areas close to big cities and towns, one cannot use 
the same rationalization to argue for or against either payment mode.
Cunha, De Giorgi and Jayachandran (2010) focus only on recipients and do not consider other 
people who may be affected. Distortion of the local economy should not be assessed solely 
on the basis of the impact on the participants in the scheme. The impact an intervention may 
have on the community as a whole, including non-participants – must be considered. This would 
satisfy the commonly agreed ‘do-no-harm’ principle and strengthen the legitimacy of the scheme 
among both local communities and other interested parties at national and international level.
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Conclusion: Lessons for the  
pro-poor REDD+ pilot project in 
Cat Tien National Park
5.1 Introduction
The Cat Tien National Park (CTNP) is located 160km north of Ho Chi Minh City and consists of 
two adjacent segments separated by agricultural land: Cat Loc in the north and Nam Cat Tien in 
the south (see Figure 2). CTNP is ‘one of the most important biodiversity hotspots in Southeast 
Asia, providing habitat for 40 globally threatened species of plants and animals and 126 species 
threatened in Viet Nam’ (SNV, n.d.). There is anecdotal evidence that it is the last remaining 
mainland habitat of the Javan rhinoceros (Rhinoceros sondaicus), although it is feared that it 
has become completely extinct. However, this habitat is threatened by land speculation by the 
richest and by agricultural expansion, particularly from the expansion of cashew production, by 
the poorest in Lam Dong province, resulting in encroachment onto CTNP (Planet Action, n.d.).
5
Figure 2. Map of Cat Tien National Park, Viet Nam
Source: Dansk Vietnamesisk Forening, Cat Tien National Park, http://www.davifo.dk/?p=214 (edited by the author).
To address this problem, the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) in 
collaboration with SNV Vietnam launched a REDD pilot project funded by the UK government’s 
Darwin Initiative to reward local communities for avoiding deforestation and for co-management 
of the forest resources.
As was highlighted in the Introduction, the Government of Viet Nam identified the design of an 
equitable benefit distribution system for REDD as a priority. In light of this, the paper has reviewed 
interventions with development and/or conservation objectives: payments for ecosystem services 
(PES), integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs), community-based natural 
resource management (CBNRM), and cash and food transfer programmes. In this section, lessons 
learned from these interventions are summarised, that are relevant in designing both an effective 
and a socially acceptable benefit distribution system for the Cat Tien REDD+ pilot project.
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Lesson	1:	Whether the distribution of the benefits associated with REDD is based on 
proportionality (in proportion to input or output), equality (equal payments to all) or need 
(social safety net) will have implications for making REDD projects pro-poor
To promote pro-poor outcomes from REDD+ interventions, it is recommended that, in areas 
where the participants are characterized by less inequality, benefit distribution based on 
proportionality and the equality of opportunities to participate would be more relevant. In an 
unequal society (for example characterized by land and income disparities), on the other hand, 
benefit distribution based on need would be more desirable so that poor or weak claimants do 
not receive disproportionately lower benefits than the relatively well-off. In places such as Viet 
Nam, where inequality between the rich and the poor in general and land disparity in particular 
is continuously increasing, a benefit distribution system that systematically favours the landless 
poor must be introduced.
Lesson	2: Equitable benefit distribution could be achieved by systematically favouring the 
landless and small landholders
Even though land disparity in Viet Nam is not at the moment strongly associated with income 
inequality (Takahashi, 2007), it will be if REDD+ rewards participants in proportion to the size 
of their landholding. This is mainly because small landholders or the landless will then lose out 
and all benefits are very likely to be captured by large landholders, who are often relatively well 
off. Takahashi (2007) found that land productivity in rural Viet Nam was inversely proportional 
to land size. This means that, the larger the land size, the less productive it is. This supports the 
argument that the transaction and opportunity costs of participating in REDD+ are negatively 
proportional to landholding size.
Therefore, as suggested by Schwarte and Mohammed (2011) and applied in practice in the 
Programa Socio Bosque in Ecuador, diminishing payments for each additional unit of land could 
be introduced in order to distribute the costs of and benefits from participation more fairly. In 
this way, participation by small landholders (who are often from ethnic minorities) is encouraged 
while ensuring that large landholders do not benefit disproportionately more from REDD+.
However, the rate of diminishing payment for each additional unit of land needs to be 
carefully determined. If the rate is too high, then many large landholders may not have the 
incentive to participate in the scheme. The rate should be just high enough to attract as many 
large landholders as possible and release more financial resources to be distributed to the 
smallholders or even landless members of the community.
Lesson	3: The decision on whether to transfer benefits to communities or directly to households 
should be done through community consultation (careful assessment of their preferences)
One of the most important issues in REDD+ benefit distribution is whether payments should 
be made directly to households or to communities as whole. Lessons from ICDPs and CBNRM 
highlight that community consultation and participation are key to the design of an effective 
benefit distribution system. Through community consultation, it is possible to assess the 
preferences of the participant communities for the amount and type of benefits, and thereby 
develop positive attitudes and promote a sense of ownership among local communities.
The higher costs associated with community consultation and participation – which are often 
required to get certified carbon credits under the Climate, Community & Biodiversity Standards 
and the Voluntary Carbon Standards – imply that there will then be fewer financial resources to 
be transferred to the recipient communities. In many ICDPs/CBNRM programmes, one of the 
factors determining the cost of community consultation and participation is the homogeneity 
or heterogeneity of the community. The more homogeneous the community, the easier and 
quicker it is to reach consensus and make decisions on benefit distribution mechanisms, and 
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the more likely interventions are to gain social acceptance if measures are taken to favour the 
‘needy’. This may in turn reduce the cost of participation and community consultation. Obviously, 
the more diverse the community, the more costly and time consuming this is.
In CTNP, some communes are quite uniform, inhabited by ethnic minorities such as the Chan Ma 
and X’Tieng, but other communes are more diverse, inhabited by communities of ex-soldiers of 
the dominant Kinh ethnic group, ethnic minorities, and migrants from the northern highlands 
such as the Tay. Therefore, the costs of participation and community consultation, and hence the 
transaction costs, will vary,.
Lesson	4: The decision on whether to transfer benefits to communities as a whole or directly 
to households should be based on both economic feasibility and local institutional capacity 
and governance structures
In addition to consultations with local people to best match community aspirations and benefit 
those in need, economic feasibility and local institutional capacity and governance structures 
are equally important. The demands of the local communities may not be economically 
feasible and/or implementation according to their needs and wants could be institutionally very 
challenging. It is argued that direct payments to households require less institutional capacity 
and no sustained flow of funds for maintenance. On the other hand, investing in community 
infrastructures through payments to communities is arguably less vulnerable to elite capture.
The amount of financial resources available in relation to the number of eligible and willing 
participants is also key to deciding whether benefits are provided directly to households or 
to the community as a whole, whether the decision is made by project developers or by 
communities. If there are too many participants, then direct payment to households might dilute 
the incentives provided and undermine the effectiveness of the scheme. In that case, investing 
in community infrastructures that can be enjoyed by all may be the second-best alternative. 
However, experiences from ICDPs/CBNRM indicate that strong governance structures are 
required to manage publicly owned goods. On the other hand, if sufficient funds are available 
and the participants prefer payments to households, then deciding whether to make transfers in 
cash or in kind is also crucial.
Lesson	5: The decision on whether to transfer benefits in cash or in kind should ‘in principle’ be 
based on participants’ preferences. If recipients are generally indifferent, then the advantages 
associated with cash and in-kind transfers should be carefully weighed and assessed
l Participants in and around CTNP who are consulted on their preference for different payment 
types and modes often (if not always) lack experience of receiving payments in exchange 
for ecosystem services provision. Therefore, their responses are less likely to be accurate and 
thus may not enhance their well-being. To avoid such problems, periodic assessment of their 
preferences and permitting reasonable flexibility to change the payment type over time are 
needed. This would allow participants to learn from experience and reconsider their preferred 
payment types.
l Benefits associated with non-consumable and productive in-kind payments can trickle down 
to non-participant landless farmers, who can be hired as labour by the recipients. Thus, in 
addition to incentivizing participants in REDD+, the intervention may have a positive effect on 
local job creation. Even though this lesson is drawn from a single PES case – in Los Negros 
in Bolivia – the experience is relevant to CTNP. According to some existing and very recent 
studies from around CTNP (for example, Petheram and Campbell, 2010), it is apparent that 
many villagers are eager to see more jobs created in their villages. This also links back to one 
of the external criteria of pro-poor REDD intervention – making use of the primary asset of 
the poor, which is labour.
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l Effects on the consumption bundle and the local economy should also be taken into 
consideration when deciding whether to provide cash or in-kind payments. It is often argued 
that cash payments would ease the budget constraints that the rural poor usually face and 
allow them to meet their basic needs. If cash payments are provided, the dependence of 
the poor on forests would be reduced. However, as was the case in many ICDPs/CBNRM 
projects, in-kind payments are more likely to be preferred in areas where the ecosystem 
service providers reside in a remote and not easily accessible area and cash is rarely used 
to buy consumable goods. The communes in and around CTNP are characterized by varying 
degrees of access to and functionality of markets. Thus, deciding whether to provide cash or 
in-kind payments in each commune should involve a clear understanding of the way the local 
market functions and whether cash is commonly and regularly used to buy basic necessities.
l Where cash payments are made, some degree of flexibility is also very important to address 
inflationary pressures. According to experiences from cash-for-work programmes, if the amount 
of cash transfer made today does not have the same value later in the project’s lifespan, then 
it is very likely that participants will abandon the project and go back to their usual destructive 
natural resource use practices. In Costa Rica, the payment amounts for PES schemes are set 
annually, typically by adjusting the previous amounts for inflation; the annual payments per 
hectare for forest conservation gradually increased from US$40 in 1997 to US$43 in 2005 
(Pagiola, 2007). To reduce the impact of inflation, contracts are now predominantly made 
in US dollars rather than in Costa Rican colones (Pagiola, 2007). Project developers should 
thus: (1) have contingency plans to make inflation-corrected payments at an early stage of 
project development; (2) save REDD+ funds in less inflation-prone currencies such as the US 
dollar; or (3) preferably make in-kind payments if it is not possible to make inflation-corrected 
payments owing to shortages in financial resources. Viet Nam is currently experiencing one 
of the highest inflation rates in Asia (more than 20 per cent according to some estimates). 
This indicates that continued inflationary pressures are going to limit the effectiveness of cash 
payments to incentivize communities to change their behaviour; in the worst-case scenario, 
participants may abandon the scheme and jeopardize the success of the project.
l Lessons from food/cash transfer programmes demonstrate that in-kind payments, if provided 
in excess, may distort the local economy by reducing the prices of consumable goods. If 
the in-kind payments are of locally produced goods, producers may be negatively affected 
by reduced commodity prices. On the other hand, if the ecosystem service sellers are 
consumers (not producers), they may benefit from the reduced prices. Such market distortions 
are very likely to happen in remote and semi-closed economies. Some communes in Lam 
Dong province are characterized as semi-closed economies. Even though some may win 
and others lose, such effects on the local economy are undesirable. Distortions are very 
likely going to be exacerbated by PES and REDD+ schemes by significantly reducing food 
production. To satisfy the commonly agreed ‘do-no-harm’ principle and to strengthen the 
legitimacy of schemes among both local communities and other interested parties at national 
and international level, the impact an intervention may have on the community as a whole 
– including non-participants has to be considered.
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5.2 Summary and way forward
In order for the poor to benefit from REDD+ in relative or absolute terms, it is crucial to carefully 
assess the impact of calculating benefits on the basis of landholding size or of actual emissions 
reduced. It is very likely that, for the sake of simplicity, landholding size is going to be used for 
providing benefits. It is feared that this approach will disproportionately favour the relatively 
well-off large landholders in countries such as Viet Nam that are experiencing widening land 
disparities. This is going to exacerbate the widening disparity between the rich and the poor 
and threaten the success of the scheme. To overcome this problem, systematic discrimination in 
favour of the poor is needed. This can be achieved by providing diminishing benefits for each 
additional unit of land.
An equitable benefit distribution system is also going to be affected by whether benefits are 
provided to communities as a whole or directly to households, and by whether benefits are 
provided in cash or in kind. Decisions should be made by carefully weighing (a) the preferences 
of the participant communities; (b) vulnerability to elite capture and corruption or looting; (c) 
the transaction costs and logistical challenges involved; and (d) the potential direct or indirect 
impact on the livelihood of poor households in general and of disadvantaged members of 
households such as women and children in particular.
As in many (if not all) development interventions, pro-poor benefit-sharing in REDD+ faces 
many challenges, such as non-transparent governance structures, an uneven playing field for 
the different actors, including ecosystem buyers and sellers, and very high transaction costs 
involved in community consultation and targeting (for both inclusion and exclusion). These 
factors will force project developers to wrestle with decisive trade-offs between equity and cost-
effectiveness or efficiency. They are crucial to the success of the REDD+ pilot project in CTNP and 
need to be addressed carefully. This will require substantial investments to:
l build effective governance structures to ensure the successful implementation of equitable 
benefit distribution in REDD+ projects; and
l empower local communities with the rights and skills to manage their resources to ensure 
that they do not lose out in negotiations involving ecosystem provisioning and rewards.
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